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Summary  findings
In 1989, the former communist countries embarked on a  weaken the political positions of the traditional
transition from centrally planned command economies to  communist oligarchy (nomenclatura), which is interested
market economies (and from repressive dictatorships to  mainly in rent-seeking.
Western-style democracies).  *  Unless stabilization and liberalization are achieved
In addressing the question, "What is the optimal  quickly, microeconomic restructuring cannot be expected
strategy for this transformation?"  Dabrowski revisits the  to progress quickly, even if privatization does (as it has in
controversy about how quickly and radically the new  Russia). Other aspects of the transition may take more
market rules and their components should be adopted in  time. For privatization to succeed, for example, a legal
the former communist countries and discusses the  base and organizational infrastructure must be created.
economic and political problems associated with  But even with privatization, a rapid transition is less risky
different strategies. Among his conclusions:  for restructuring and for complex institutional reform
- Generally, the faster and more comprehensive the  than a slow transition.
economic reform, the more chance there is to minimize  * There  is no way to avoid a relatively large decline in
its economic, social, and political costs, and to avoid  output, especially of industrial production  in the state
chronic macroeconomic mismanagement. A more radical  sector.
and disciplined path of transition is all the more  *  Granting concessions to, and bargaining with,
important when initial conditions are less favorable and  various pressure groups does not produce the expected
negative external shocks are greater. Only countries such  political results or increase social acceptance of reform.
as Hungary - which had made some progress in market-  *  Governments should not be afraid of "aiming too
oriented reform before communism's collapse and which  high" in embarking on a stabilization program or any
experienced less macroeconomic disequilibrium - could  other component  of transformation.  Most post-
go more slowly.  communist governments do the opposite: dilute the
*  Political liberalization and democratization helps the  program so much it becomes ineffective.
economic transition succeed mainly because it helps
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In  1989,  the  former  communist  countries  (FCC)  embarked  on  the  transition  from  a
command, centrally planned economy to a market economy.  At the same time,  they began to
transforn  their  political  systems from  repressive dictatorships  into Western-style  democratic
regimes.  The transition to democracy and the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE)  and  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  may  be  the  most  important  political  and
economic event in the world history of the last decade of the 20th century.
This paper deals mainly  with the problem of the optimal transformation strategy.  The
intention is to revisit the controversy of how quickly and radically the new market  rules (and
their  individual components)  should  be adopted  in  the FCC  and  the economic  and political
consequences of different strategies.
The topic and issues presented in this working paper are a continuation  of my  research
and resulting papers from 1990 and  1991 [see Dabrowski,  1992b].  These analyses were based
primarily on Polish and a few CEE early transition cases.  Hence, this study can benefit from
the longer transition history in CEE and from the experience of FSU countries which entered
the  transformation  process  in  1992.  Although  some  hypotheses  and  conclusions  are  less
controversial than  they  were  two  or  three  years  ago,  it  is  still  too  early  to  elaborate  any
comprehensive and stable theory of post-comrnunist economic transition.  This is too difficult a
task for one person.  Therefore,  this paper is a preliminary  sketch of specific problems rather
than a comprehensive and closed monograph.
The paper is organized in the following way:
Chapter II gives a short description of the specific features of post-communist economic
transition in comparison with policy reforms adopted after World War II in many Western and
developing  countries.  The  identification  of  the  real  transition  strategies  is  the  subject  of
Chapter III.  In the first section of this chapter,  I propose a more developed classification of
the transition strategies adopted in different countries in the period 1989-94.  In Sections 2 and
3, I try to evaluate different strategies from the economic and political points of view.  Section
4 analyzes separately the question of output decline under transition.  In Chapter IV, I return
to the transition  strategy debate.  Section  1 summarizes the controversy  about shock therapy
versus gradualism.  Section 2  tries  to  demonstrate which  specific  components  of  transition
must be done quickly and which of them can be done more gradually.  Section 3 is devoted to
the  sequencing  issue,  and  Section  4  describes  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  slow
transition.  Section 5  analyzes to  what extent  the different  starting  conditions  influence the
transition  strategy,  and  Section 6 discusses the issue of  democracy and  market  reform.  In
Chapter V some practical recommendations are formulated.  Finally,  in the postscript, I try to
mention some recent developments during 1995.
The main conclusion of this paper is related to the question of speed and sequencing of
the post-communist  transition.  Generally,  the  more  fast  and  comprehensive  the economicreform is, the more chance there is to minimize the economic, social and political costs of this
process and  avoid chronic macroeconomic mismanagement.  Less favorable initial conditions
and  bigger  negative  external  shocks  are  also  arguments  in  favor  of  a  more  radical  and
disciplined path of transition.  Only countries such as Hungary, that achieved some progress in
market  oriented  reform  earlier  (before  communist  regime  collapsed)  and  had  less
macroeconomic  disequilibrium,  could  go  more  slowly.  Second,  a  general  conclusion  is
connected with the crucial role of the initial stabilization and liberalization package.  Without
success  in  this  sphere,  it  is  hardly  expected  that  quick  progress  will  take  place  in
microeconomic restructuring even if the privatization process is going very fast (as in Russia).
Third, political liberalization and democratization helps successful economic transition mainly
because it contributes to weakening the political positions of traditional communist  oligarchy
(nomenlatura), interested mainly in parasite rent-seeking.
2II.  The Specific Features of Post-Communist Transition
1. Economic specifics
The agenda  of  post-communist  transition  differs  very  much  from  the  policy  reforms
adopted in the last ten to fifteen years by many middle-income,  developing countries, such as
Chile, Mexico, Argentina,  Peru, Bolivia, Egypt, and India and after World War II by some of
the developed countries, such as Germany and Japan.
The  comprehensive  and  complex  reconstruction  program  undertaken  in  post-war
Germany under  Minister  of  Economy Ludwig  Erhard  involved only the  reintroduction  of  a
stable currency and market regulation after some ten years of a fascist command economy and
war.  The economy was never nationalized, and all basic legal market institutions survived the
war.
The Japanese economy,  though  less developed than the Gernan  one,  was also  mostly
privately  owned  and  severely  damaged  by  the  war.  Its  market  mechanism  was  partly
suspended by war and by command-type regulations [see Sachs,  1995].
Most  of  the  developing  countries  seeking  to  change  their  economic  systems  had  to
contend with high inflation or hyperinflation and with economies that were  overregulated and
closed to external competition.  Some of them had accumulated a  lot of structural distortions.
However,  these distortions  were  not  as  dramatic as  those  inherited  by  the FCC,  especially
those in the FSU.  Some developing countries also had to privatize their economies, but all of
them,  including Chile after Allende,  undertook their reforms  in a private  economy.  Chile's
transition  was probably  the  most  comprehensive and  radical outside  the  former  communist
block.  But even the Chilean  transformation of the 1970s and  1980s seems  less difficult and
dramatic than that of Eastern Europe and the FSU [Edwards and Edwards, 1991].
I fully agree with Stanley Fisher and Alan Gelb [Marer and Zecchini,  1991, p.  184] who
wrote four years ago:
"In fact  most  of the  individual requirements for  socialist  economy reform have been
faced  before,  in  China,  and  in  Latin  American  and  African  countries  where  the
combination  of  a  weak  private  sector,  political  monopoly,  heavy  policy  induced
distortions and macroeconomic imbalance is not uncommon.  Nonetheless the challenge
is unique, in  its system-wide scope,  in its political  and historical  context, and  in the
speed of desired reform. "
A similar view was expressed by Leszek Balcerowicz [1994, p. 80] three years later:
"[Under communist rule [...]  capitalism was destroyed and not merely suspended (as in
Germany  before  1948)  or  distorted  (as  in  Latin  America  and  India  before  their
respective rounds of economic liberalization).
3The  new  democratic  governments  in  the  FCC  inherited  a  range  of  serious  economic
problems  which  determined  the  agenda  of  the  transition.  The  four  chief  problems  are  as
follows:
1.  Total or almost total nationalization of the economy left a very limited role for private
savings  and  implied  either  explicit  prohibition  of  or  serious  restrictions  on  private
economic  activity'.  To  make  matters  worse,  the  official  systems  of  education  and
propaganda in all the FCC tried to convince people of the superiority of state control
(sometimes  referred  to  as  "social"  or  "all-national")  over  private  ownership.  This
indoctrination  lasted more than 40 years  in CEE,  including  the Baltic countries,  and
more than 70 years in the other parts of the FSU.
2.  Huge  structural  distortions  stemmed  from  the  monopolization,  economic  autarky,
administrative  price  regulation,  and  centralized  investment  decisions.  The  former
communist  economies  were  strongly  oriented  to  domestic  and  regional  markets  (the
latter  through  the  Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  - CMEA)  and  were
separated  from  other  markets  by  currency  inconvertibility,  price  controls,  trade
restrictions,  and the state monopoly in foreign trade.
3.  The state undertook  a high  level of social spending relative to  the level of economic
development  [see Sachs,  1995].  This part  of the communist  heritage  is a  relatively
young one,  because the first  decades of the communist  regime  were characterized  by
austere policies in social spending.  This situation started to change some time after the
death of Stalin and the round of  social and political unrest  (GDR  in  1953, Poland  in
1956  and  1970,  Hungary  in  1956,  Czechoslovakia  in  1968).  Less  repressive  (in
comparison with the Stalinist period) mutations of communist regimes looked for some
form of social support and legitimization.  This was the case of Hungary under Janos
Kadar  (so-called  goulash  socialism),  Poland  under  Edward  Gierek,  the  GDR  under
Erich Honecker,  or the Soviet Union under  Leonid Brezhnev.  In  some cases,  social
spending was an attempt to neutralize the expected social unrest coming from political
tightening  (Czechoslovakia  under  Gustav  Husak  and  Poland  under  Wojciech
Jaruzelski).
4.  Domestic  and  external  macroeconomic  disequilibrium  prevailed  and  was  especially
strong during the final years of the communist regimes, when they lost their capacity to
control economic and social life.  Partly it resulted from factors described  in points 2
and  3.  Only  the  former  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  the  former  GDR  avoided
dramatic macroeconomic crises, but even in these countries (and especially in Hungary)
the degree  of  macroeconomic  stability  was far  from  Western  standards.  Domestic
disequilibrium  manifested itself  in the  form  of  a rising  budget deficit  and  monetary
expansion, difficulties in controlling wages, and other serious problems leading to high
inflation either in repressed (a "shortage economy",  to use Janos Kornai's  terminology)
or in open form.  The external imbalances usually led to growing foreign debt.
4These  four  characteristics  show  the  differences  of  East  European  and  post-Soviet
transition in comparison with communist countries in East or South East Asia,  such as China,
Vietnam, or Laos.  They inherited less structural distortions mainly because they were far less
industrialized  than the  FSU  or  CEE  [Sachs and  Woo,  1994].  Asian  communist  countries
offered their people far less social support than did the FSU and CEE [Sachs,  1995], and they
succeeded in keeping more macroeconomic equilibrium (especially China) in comparison with
most of FCC.
In short,  the post-communist transformation is a complex undertaking concerning almost
all aspects of the economic system and  many aspects of the political  system.  This  makes it
difficult to single out the most important elements of that process.  For the requirements of this
paper,  I  will  operate  with  a  simplified  scheme  which  names  three  basic  elements  of  the
transformation  process:  (a)  macroeconomic  stabilization,  (b)  liberalization  (deregulation)
connected with  the change  in the system of  economic institutions,  and  (c) privatization  and
restructuring.
2. Political issues
Along with changes in the economic system, the political transition from an authoritarian
and highly repressive system to a democratic one has taken place.  Here also the 20th century
history of the discussed region has not been helpful to achieve this goal.  If we look back at
the inter-war period only Czechoslovakia had Western European type democracy all that time.
Other  Eastern  European  countries  (including  Baltic states) enjoyed  only  a  limited period of
rather unstable democracy with frequent attempts of authoritarian coup d'  etats.  Some of them
were  successful  leading  to  semi-dictatorial  regimes  (examples  of  Poland,  Lithuania,  and
Hungary).  Russia and other nations of former Russian (later Soviet) empire did not have any
democratic tradition in their history.  Additionally, many of them did not have any experience
with their own independent state.  Thus in  1990s most of the FSU countries'  had to build the
basic institutions of an independent state from scratch.
In  these  circumstances,  a  young  parliamentary  democracy  often  is  connected  with
political instability (e.g.,  Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Poland) that complicates an economic
transition.  On the other hand, the socially painful and politically difficult agenda of economic
transition contributes to political turbulence.
There  are  many  historical  cases  when  a  transition  from  "suspended"  or  "distorted"
capitalism (using Balcerowicz's terminology) to its more liberal and macroeconomically more
stable version  was accompanied  by  the political  changes from  an  authoritarian  regime  to  a
democratic one.  It happened not only in Germany, Austria, and Japan after World War II but
also in many developing countries during  the last 20 years (especially in Latin America).  In
many cases,  e.g.,  in  Germany and  Austria,  however,  democracy  was restored  rather  than
The same also concerns most of the former Yugoslav republics.
5created for the first time.  In some other countries, economic reforms were implemented  by
authoritarian regimes (as in Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore).  In China and
Vietnam, extensive economic  reforms have been implemented  without any substantial  changes
in the political system.  Leszek Balcerowicz  [1994] classifies  these two cases as a peculiarly
Asian kind of post-communist  transition, as opposed to the Central and Eastern European one.
For this reason and because of different economic  specifics  (see Section 1), these countries are
not included  in this analysis.
6III. Transition  Strategies  and Results
1. Attempt  to identify transformation  strategies
After  five years  of transformation  in the former CMEA countries  and  after more than
two years of a similar process  on FSU  territory,2 much empirical experience  is available for
both researchers and policymakers.  A very diversified and complicated picture is seen.
More  than  30  countries  in  Europe  and  Asia  are  involved  in  the  transition  from
communism.  With the exception of Cuba and  North Korea,  there are no classic communist
economies  left.  Not  all  the  transition  countries,  however,  have  already  completed  the
journey-or  even most of it-from  a socialist economic system to a market economy.  Indeed,
in the Fall of 1994 some of the post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, Belarus, and some of the
Central Asia countries,  have not yet made an unequivocal decision to move toward  a market
economy.  They are either looking for  a third way or trying to preserve what remains of the
communist system in politics and in the economy (e.g.,  partial price controls, export controls,
and a central role for state ownership).
There are three basic parameters for classifying the transition strategies:
1.  The  speed  of  actions  in  the  main  fields  of  transition:  macroeconomic  stabilization,
liberalization and institutional changes, privatization and restructuring.
2.  The comprehensiveness  and internal consistency of implemented policies,  creating the
so-called  critical  mass of  reform and  avoiding both  macroeconomic mismanagement
and a more serious systemic vacuum on the microlevel.
3.  The cumulative progress in transition achieved so far.
With  respect to  all three  factors,  the countries  of Central  and  Eastern Europe  and the
FSU 3 may be  classified into six broad  categories.  They are defined mainly  along the third
criterion,  i.e.,  the cumulative progress in the transition process, although the two other criteria
also play an important role.  The proposed categories are:
1.  One country (the former GDR in mid-1990) embarked on an extremely  radical, once-
and-for-all  transformation  of the  economic  system,  made  possible  through  the  rapid
"importation"  of  a  stable  currency  and  of  most  economic  institutions  from  West
Germany.
2  Analysis in this paper covers generally the period 1989-1994  only.  Some recent updating will be
presented  in last section  ("Post scriptum").
3 China and  Vietnam are excluded from this  classification for the earlier mentioned  reasons.  Macedonia
and Mongolia are not analyzed because I do not have the necessary information about these countries.
72.  A group  of countries  (Poland,  the Czech  Republic,  Slovakia, 4 Albania,  Estonia,  and
Latvia)  embarked  on  a  radical  path  of  transformation  (in  terms  of  the  speed  and
consistency)  containing  the  initial  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  an  extensive
domestic and external  liberalization of the economy.  These programs  were followed
by the launching of privatization.  (Some delays in privatization came from the need to
draft appropriate legislation and set up  monitoring  institutions).  By the end of  1994,
these countries accomplished the critical mass of reforms  and completed the first stage
of the transition process.
3.  By the end of 1994, Hungary and Slovenia achieved a level of progress in the transition
process similar to the second group of countries.  They moved, however,  much slower
but  in a rather  well coordinated way.  They had  a better  starting point,  especially in
terms of the earlier liberalization of the economy and institutional reforms.
In the case of Slovenia, the notion about a  slow path of transition  concerns the
large privatization.  The macroeconomic adjustment after separation from the Yugoslav
federation  in  1991 was really  radical.  Slovenia did  not  need to  take  any  dramatic
measures about the domestic and external liberalization because the former Yugoslavia
had  a  far  more  deregulated  and  open  economy  than  other  FCCs.  Hungary  moved
gradually  on all three transition  dimensions.  Its liberalization  program lasted at least
three  years  [Gacs,  1994],  and  macroeconomic  policy  never  adopted  any  dramatic
measures.  Hungary also has not adopted any spectacular mass privatization policy like
the Czech, Russian, or German ones.
4.  Countries in the middle of the process  implemented a number of significant changes
(an example is the  Russian voucher privatization)  but did  not finish until  the end  of
1994 a comprehensive  package  to transform  their economies.  This  diverse group  is
made up of three types:
a/  Lithuania,  Kyrgyzstan,  and  Moldova  failed  to  do  radical  stabilization  and
liberalization  at  the  beginning  of  transition.  Now,  they  are  doing  more  to
stabilize and liberalize their economies successfully, and they have a chance to
catch up  with  the second and  third groups  in the near future.  Lithuania and
Kyrgyzstan are doing quite well in the privatization sphere.
b/  Romania  and  Russia  engaged  in  important  reforms  but  have  not  had  well
coordinated  transition  policies  (especially  in  the  macroeconomic  sphere)  and
have suffered macroeconomic mismanagement.
c/  In 1991, Bulgaria started a very radical liberalization and stabilization program
similar to Polish and Czecho-Slovak ones, and it makes up this category.  But
4 After the dissolution  of the Czecho-Slovak  federation,  this country  slowed down the transition  process  in
comparison  with the Czech Republic,  especially  in the sphere  of privatization.
8later, it slowed down the transition process and did not achieve the critical mass
of changes.  Moreover,  the inability to start large-scale privatization has led to
the  return  of  a  policy  of  soft  budget  constraints  in  relation  to  state  owned
enterprises and to the significant erosion of macroeconomic policy in 1993-94.
5.  A few countries  undertook  no  significant systemic changes  and  made  little progress
towards  liberalization  and  privatization of  the economy until  the end  of  1994.  This
lead  sooner  (Ukraine)  or  later  (Belarus,  some  Central  Asian  states)  to  economic
destabilization and high inflation or hyperinflation.
6.  Countries  at  war  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  Georgia,
Armenia,  Azerbeijan,  Tadjikistan,  and  Croatia)  where  economic reforns  were  never
launched or  were  halted  and where  war-related  expenditures  and the destruction  and
disorganization of the economy have led to hyperinflation  make up this group.  Like
the fourth category,  this one is made up of countries with important differences among
themselves  in the level  of economic development,  intended economic  strategies,  and
the  size of  real  war  damages.  For  example,  Armenia,  Croatia,  and  Serbia  started
reforms but stopped them.  The inability to implement a comprehensive transformation
package could be seen, however, as the common denominator of this group.
The  categorization  proposed  here  differs  significantly  from  the  standard  dichotomy
between shock  therapy  and a  gradual approach that will be  discussed later  in this  paper.
Yet the real picture is much more complicated than described.  In practice,  there is more than
one variant  both of the radical (shock) scenario and of gradualism.  Some cases escape neat
classification.  For example,  in the beginning of  1994, the new Yugoslavia 5 and Croatia  had
taken ambitious anti-inflationary measures.  At the end of 1994, large transition packages were
discussed in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Belarus.
2. Economic effectiveness of different  strategies
Tables  1-3 present three basic economic indicators-GDP  growth or decline, the annual
rate of inflation, and the unemployment rate-of  24 countries in transition.  (See Tables  1, 2,
and 3 at the end of this paper.)  These countries represent all the categories characterized in the
previous  section  except  East  Germany.  To  interpret  those  data,  one  must  remember,  of
course,  that the quality  of transition  statistics is often problematic.  For example,  before the
transition  started,  the  GDP  level  was  very  often  overestimated;  after  the  beginning  of
transition,  GDP  has  usually  been  underestimated  for  many  methodological  reasons  [see
Bratkowski,  1993a].  The inflation statistics in the FSU  before 1992 were very  poor.  Even
now  their  quality  remains  problematic  in  some  FSU  countries,  in  part  because  persistent
market shortages (i.e.  repressed form of inflation) remain in some transition economies.
5 The new Yugoslavia  is Serbia and Macedonia.
9With-all these methodological reservations,  the available statistical data seem to show an
advantage to  countries  which  belong to  the  second and  third  group  in comparison  with  the
groups 4,  5  and 6.  Also countries  from  group 4  generally look better  than countries from
groups  5 and  6.  This  statement  relates both  to  the  inflation figures  and  to  the cumulative
output  decline.  The  latter  is  also  influenced  by  at  least  two  other,  and  to  some  extent,
interrelated factors: inherited macroeconomic and structural distortions, and the size of adverse
external shocks (see  Section 4).  Slovenia,  for  example, has not  depended  on CMEA  trade
(however,  it  suffered,  to  some  extent,  from  the  collapse  of  the  Yugoslav  market).  The
Hungarian economy before  1989 was more open to the West than other  Comecon countries.
On the other hand,  Bulgaria heavily depended on CMEA trade and additionally suffered  very
much  from  the  Gulf  Crisis  in  1990-91  as  well  as  from  the  UN  sanctions  against  new
Yugoslavia.
The same type of differentiation can be observed in the former USSR.  On the one hand,
Ukraine,  Belarus,  and the Baltic states lost  very much from  the collapse of the FSU market
and  from  energy  price  adjustments.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia,  Turkmenistan,  and
Uzbekistan, as net exporters of energy resources and other raw materials,  could probably gain
something from trade reorientation and changes in the price structure.
The advantage of the first three groups (including the GDR) would be even greater if our
analysis included fiscal balances, balance of payments statistics, stability of the exchange rate,
or  factors  such  as  quality  of  consumer  and  producer  markets.  Also  the  microeconomic
restructuring  seems  to  be  more advanced  in  the first  three  groups than  in the  others.  The
unemployment statistics presented in Table 3 seem to support this hypothesis indirectly.
Of course,  one can propose a completely opposite interpretation of Table 3.  Countries
that adopted quicker and more  radical strategies experienced generally higher unemployment
than  did  countries  that  either  went  slower  (group  4  with  the  exceptions  of  Bulgaria  and
Romania)  or  have  not  start  the  real  transition  yet  (group  5).  Perhaps  the  superiority  of
gradualism  and  softer  macroeconomic  policy  might  be  seen  as  socially  less  painful  and
politically less risky.  Such an  interpretation,  however,  would be  very  short-sighted.  First,
the increase of unemployment  seems to be  unavoidable,  and  the soft macroeconomic policy
and  the  blockade  of  privatization  may  only  delay  this  phenomenon.  Prospects  of
microeconomic restructuring  and economic recovery are delayed by these policies.  Second,
very high inflation or hyperinflation,  an unavoidable product of the soft fiscal and monetary
policies  supporting  employment,  may do  more  political  damage  than  high  unemployment.
Third,  hoarding  labor  in SOEs  without any  production  tasks (because output  has declined)
creates no fewer social tensions than does open unemployment.
Slow  and  inconsistent  changes  also  make  the  transition  difficult.  Macroeconomic
instability  and  the  lack  of  sufficient  competition  create  greater  income  and  wealth
differentiation and often encourage criminal practices.
Comparing the strategies used by the second and  third groups is extremely interesting.
Both groups of countries achieved about the same level of progress in the transition  process,
10completing de facto  the first stage and making it irreversible.  However, the third group
reformed more slowly than both the first  and second groups.  The same final result was
possible  because the third group started from a better initial position than the second group in
sophistication  in creating market institutions, in having smaller structural distortion, and in
possessing  more business experience of SOEs competing on the international  market.  This
explains why the gradualist policy could give any positive results at all-contrary  to other
Eastern  European  countries (Romania  or Bulgaria)  and the FSU.
However, whether the Hungarian or Slovenian  gradualism  is seen as a real success story
remains a question.  First,  the macroeconomic  situation and the prospects for the economic
growth of Hungary at the end of 1994 seem to be worse than that of other Central European
countries. Second, one can argue that by implementing  more radical strategies,  both Hungary
and Slovenia  could achieve  more.
3. Political effectiveness  of different strategies
Politicians  often perceive radical moves toward a market economy  as a greater risk and a
concentration of difficulties and material sacrifices.  Thus radical restructuring may cause
more social resistance to changes.  Numerous politicians, particularly those who do not feel
strong social support, prefer the strategy of gradual, slow transformations;  put off the most
painful moves; and look for "theoretical"  arguments  to justify such an approach.
The election defeat of  democratic, pro-reform forces and  success of  populist, anti-
reformers6  are another argument against radical economic transition.  However, there is a
danger of misinterpretation  of these election results.
In countries  where anti-reform 7 parties won elections, only Poland presents a case of the
radical strategy. However, non-economic  factors, such as the so-called 'war on the top' in the
Solidarity  camp or a conflict around the role of the Catholic Church in political life, played
important roles.  The Lithuanian pro-democratic movement Sajudis failed to  implement a
radical economic  transition (contrary to Estonia and Latvia) and managed a rather weak, pro-
inflationary  macroeconomic  policy.  The Hungarian right-wing  government ruling from 1990
to  1994 was very reluctant to implement a radical transition scenario.  The partial election
failure of democratic  forces in Russia in December 1993  can also be seen as the result of their
inability  to control very high inflation. Only the first success  of Slovakian  HZDS (Movement
for Democratic  Slovakia, Vladimir Mechiar's party) can be partly attributed to the resistance
against Vaclav Klaus' radical transition policy (including  the idea of coupon privatization).
6 I have in mind  the left wing political parties, having a post-communist  origin, which won in Lithuania,
Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and in part of Russia, and other populist or nationalistic formations
(Slovakia,  Russia).
7 The main criterion for classifying a party as anti-reform  is its program and slogans proposed to the
electorate.
11However, nationalistic  arguments may have played a more important  role here than economic
ones.
Other political stories in Eastern Europe showed that gradual transition strategies and
populist macroeconomic policies were not  political assets.  The election defeats of  the
Ukrainian  President  Leonid Kravchuk  and the Belarusian  Prime Minister Vyacheslav  Kebich in
1994  were good examples.
A rapid rotation of political elites is likely with a deep economic crisis and a young,
unstable democratic regime.  But cyclical changes of  political sympathies occur in  every
democratic  society.  In a young democratic  environment  with very weak political parties and
very unstable public opinion, such a cycle may be much shorter.  Some analysts forecast that
the recent election trend favoring the social-democratic  parties of post-communist  origin will
be quickly reversed as the public learns that economic  problems cannot be solved by painless
methods as had been promised during election campaigns (see Samonis [1995] in relation to
Lithuania).
There are lessons for political leaders in transition countries based on experience. They
should focus more on exploiting  the political window of opportunity  (which usually occurred
at the very beginning of the transition process) 8 for making as many reforms as possible for
benefit of the country rather than on short term personal political survival.  A stable personal
career cannot be expected in so unstable a political environment.  A sound and responsible
transition  policy involves a risk of political  failure in the short run but may result in long-term
credibility  and popularity.9
4. Output decline under transition
As Table 1 shows, a deep output decline has been a common phenomenon for all the
transition economies.  This  decline occurred regardless of  the  transition strategy used.
However, the size of this decline, discussed  in the Section 2 of this chapter, varied according
to what strategy the country adopted,  conditions  at the beginning of the transition, or external
shocks.
Although real output declines were smaller than officially registered, they occurred and
they were important. These declines  posed a significant  intellectual  and political  challenge for
most of the economists  and politicians in the FCC who had been educated in the communist
8 L. Balcerowicz  [1994] names this specific  window of opportunity  after a collapse of communism  as the
period of "extraordinary  politics."
9 Recent  Polish history gives a good example of this. The former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance  Leszek  Balcerowicz  left office  at the end of 1991  unpopular  and attacked  by most of the political  parties.
Three years later, when the positive results of the radical transition  policy became evident, his popularity is
steadily  rising while most of his critics have disappeared  politically.
12fascination of material  output and quantity  indicators of growth.  But even for many Western
economists,  the size and the length of the post-communist  output decline was surprising.  A
number of misinterpretations were made in both the East and West about what had happened in
the FCC.  One misinterpretation compares the post-communist  output decline with the Great
Depression  1929-1933  [Laski,  Bhaduri and  Levcik,  1993].  Another  one  sees  the roots  of
decline  in  the  operation  of  great  destruction  of  the  former  economic  system  which  was
supposedly planned by the  radical reformers  or  advocates of shock therapy [Kolodko,  1991;
Kolodko, 1992].  The first one has involved a critique of stabilization policy in the FCC as too
restrictive and  a proposal  to  reactivate the economy  as quickly as possible  using  the global
demand  management  measures.  The  second  one  has  led  to  advocating  a  more  gradual
approach  to  transition  and  to  suggesting  more  government  intervention.  Both
misinterpretations and conclusions have not been  in conflict with each  other and  often have
been presented jointly.
A general look at economic events of the last five years undermines the relevance of both
theories.  It is very hard to interpret the post-communist output decline as a cyclical, demand-
type contraction.  I  prefer  to  use  a  notion  of  "output  decline"  rather  than  "recession,"
"depression,"  or  "contraction."  The  collapse  of  the  regulating  and  resource  mobilizing
capacities of the command economic system happened in most countries before the economic
transition started.  Rather, political liberalization and democratization have made further use of
the command system impossible.
Post-communist  output  decline  seems  to  be  affected  by  the  combination  of  different
macroeconomic  and  microeconomic  factors.  Of  course,  the  composition  of  these  factors
differs  across  the  countries.  Individual  characteristics  of  each  country  would  need  more
detailed statistical examination that is beyond the purview of this paper.  I want to concentrate
on drafting some general hypotheses.
On the macroeconomic  side,  the output decline is caused by the reduction  of aggregate
demand coming from two factors:
1.  Elimination of the speculative demand connected with a shortage economy.' 0 It  is one
shot factor but influencing the initial output decline (decreasing demand for the period
of decumulation of inventories).
2.  The excess  demand coming  from the current  (flow) macroeconomic  imbalances as  a
result of  stabilization policy  was eliminated (such an  effect  is connected with  every
stabilization program, not only those in the FCC).
10  Let me quote the interesting  statement  of Jan Winiecki [1990, pp.781-783]: 'There is a share of output
in an STE (Soviet-Type  Economy  - M.D.) that simply  would not have existed  in a less wasteful  economic  system.
No less importatantly,  this output, although it contributes  to economic  growth of every STE, does not contribute
to economic  warfare.1/..  / the fall of output occured  in all areas of the economy  without in any way reducing  the
welfare  of the household  sector.' See  also - Gomulka  [1991, p.61.
13In addition to the above two factors, some countries lose output as result of permanent
high inflation or hyperinflation. These kinds of losses do not prevent further losses of output
when a stabilization  program finally is implemented.
Macroeconomic factors,  though  obvious,  are  probably  not  the  most  important.
Microeconomic  factors are far more influential.
The first group of microeconomic  factors is connected with the shift in the relative
demand  which has both external and domestic  origins.  On the external  side, some important
export markets collapsed: first, CMEA (1990-91), the Iraq market (1990-91), and the Soviet
interrepublican  market (1992-93).  Also, the collapse of Yugoslav (1991) and Czecho-Slovak
(1992-93) federations had some effect on their former member countries.  Finally, the UN
sanctions  against  the new Yugoslavia  hurt the economies  of the FY states  and Bulgaria  and to a
lesser extent, Romania and Hungary.  Trade liberalization  leads usually to an increasing  share
of both import and export in GDP.  New import opportunities decrease demand for some
domestic  products  while new export opportunities  give a chance to increase  production of other
goods.  However, because the elasticity of supply response is usually limited (see below), a
shift in relative demand  coming from import liberalization  must be connected  with a temporary
decrease  of output."l
Several domestic factors contributed to  the shift in the relative demand and affected
seriously the activity of some sectors: demilitarization (a substantial  factor in the FSU and
Slovakia), decreasing investment rate and change in  the structure of investment demand,
rationalization  of  inter-regional  links  (especially  in  Russia),  elimination  of  forced
substitution,  12 more consumer freedom coming from elimination of the rationing system and
from privatization  of part of collective  consumption  (e.g., housing).
The second group of microeconomic  factors has been connected  with a dramatic  change
in the cost level and structure.  In analyzing the domestic sources of cost shock to some
industries, the elimination of explicit and implicit subsidies' 3 must be mentioned.  In some
extreme cases, production has been maintained  despite value subtracting  (i.e.,  with negative
value added) [Hare and Hughes, 1991; McKinnon, 19911. This means the non-personal  costs
of  production, converted to  world prices, are  higher than the  value of  production sold
11 This hypothesis seems to be especially relevant to industrial and other material production. Import
liberalization  can contribute to the parallel expansion  of the trade and service sector, underdeveloped  in the
communist  economy [see Berg and Sachs, 1991] and presenting  a far greater elasticity (in terms of potential
supply response) than  the sector of material production. The development  of trade and services (including
financial  services)  can very  quickly offset  the decline  in material  production  as happened  in Poland  in 1990-93.
12 In the past it was a standart  by-product  of the shortage  economy.
13 The most frequent form of hidden subsidies has had a form of underpricing energy and transport
services  as well as enviromental  costs.
14according  to  world  prices.  The  elimination  of  this  production  means  a  real  gain  for  the
national economy even though some enterprises or industries must be closed down.  1 4
Similar developments have come with an external price shock,  partly as a result of the
unification of the exchange  rate (elimination of  implicit  subsidies connected with a  multiple
exchange rate regime)  and partly with the elimination of special price arrangements inside the
CMEA  or  the FSU.  If  a  government  wants to  isolate  enterprises  from  the  external  price
shock,  maintaining  explicit  or  implicit  subsidies  (as happened  in  the  Ukraine  in  1993-94),
leads to a serious balance of payments crisis and to a physical shortage of critical  inputs such
as energy.  Both factors depress the level of production. 15
Finally,  the third group of microeconomic factors has been related to the broad category
of motivation and information problems:
1.  The  command  system's  mobilization  role  and  its  incentives  collapsed.  This  has
happened in most countries as a  result of  political liberalization  and democratization,
before the economic transition started.
2.  Expectations  and  incentives were  created  by  the  privatization  process  including  the
insider-outsider game of who will take over the enterprise as a private owner,  outflow
of the best personnel and management to the new private sector, so-called  "end game"
[Blanchard and Dabrowski,  1993] or privatization death [Mertlik,  1993].
3.  The massive bailout of state enterprises by the government ("government will not allow
to  close down  the biggest  state-owned enterprises")  was expected.  This  belief  was
based  on  past  experience  when  even the  most  radical variants  of  economic  reforms
(such as Yugoslav,  Hungarian, or Polish ones) were not able to make the soft budget
constraints  for  SOEs harder.  It  has been a  reason why the SOEs'  adjustment to  the
new environment was relatively slow and  why a big inter-enterprise  debt exploded  in
some countries  [see Rostowski,  1993].  Further  developments have depended on the
credibility of government policy (see Chapter 4, Section 4).
The transition economy is a two-sector economy in the following sense: one part of the
economy (mainly SOEs in heavy and military  industries, big industrialized  construction,  and
often socialized agriculture) is declining sharply because of the above-mentioned factors.  The
second one  (mainly the new private  and privatized  sectors in trade  and services)  is growing
dynamically.  The decline of  the first part  frees resources,  such  as labor,  energy and  other
14 To be precise, the elimination  of value-detracting  production  should contribute to increase of GDP.
However, it makes a gross industrial  (or agriculture)  output lower what creates some problems in the sphere of
politics and social  perception  of the transition  process because  of traditional  using gross output indicators. Beside
it, elimination  of value-detracting  production  change very often the structure of intermediary  demand what can
lead to output  decline  in the earlier phases  of production  chain.
51 do not mention  here a serious  fiscal  crisis.
15inputs, building  and real estate,  and enables the rapid development  of the second part.  The
speed  of  development  of  the  "new  economy"  depends  very  much  on  the  real  economic
freedom (i.e.,  the comprehensiveness and transparency of liberalization process),  the presence
of hard budget constraints, a stable macroeconomic environment (important for the investment
climate), and progress in privatization and restructuring of SOEs.
16IV. Speed, Comprehensiveness,  and Sequencing  of the Transition
1. Historical  controversy  around  transition  strategy
The most relevant strategy of economic transition from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy is controversial and has dominated the political and intellectual debates of the
past six years.  The choice of relevant transition  strategy is more difficult than designing the
final economic model, i.e.,  a private market economy with a stable currency.  Perhaps a useful
lesson for the FCC in elaborating adequate transition policy is the experience (mainly negative)
of  those  countries  which  tried  to  reform the  socialist  economy during  last  30 years  of  the
communist  regime.  For  latecomers  like  some  of  the  FSU  countries,  the  experience  of
transformation pioneers can be of great importance.
The initial policy dilemma seemed to be the radical strategy of fast and comprehensive
changes (very  often  called  shock  therapy)  on  the  one  hand  and  the  evolutionary  way of
gradual (step by step) changes on the other.  During the last five years,  this controversy was
widely discussed and various arguments came from the following:
*  the theoretical foundation of economic science [Ees and Garretsen,  1994],
*  political  economy  and  political  dynamics  of  the  transition  process  [Aslund,
1994; Dabrowski,  1992b; Balcerowicz,  1994],
*  inertial nature of human behavior [Murrell,  1992],
*  the gradual nature of institutional changes [ECE, 1993],
*  consistency of the new economic system and necessity to break down the inertia
of the old system [Balcerowicz, 1993; Dabrowski,  1992b],
*  nature  of the macroeconomic  stabilization and  the role of expectation  [Sachs,
1994; Balcerowicz,  1989; Balcerowicz and Gelb,  1994],
*  negative experience of the reforms  of the socialist economy in the past  [Sachs
and Lipton,  1990; Dabrowski,  1992b],
*  economic and social costs of transformation (output decline and unemployment)
[Nuti and Portes,  1993; Laski, Bhaduri and Levcik,  1993; Roland, 1994],
*  fiscal consequences of adopted transition  strategy [Kolodko,  1992; Aghion and
Blanchard,  1993], and
*  the environment for private sector development [Johnson and Loveman,  1995].
Important weaknesses of the transformation strategy debate of the last five years are as
follows:
17First, neither shock therapy nor gridualism was defined precisely in terms of the speed
of transition  process and the types of policy instruments  relevant to each alternative  strategy.
Second, this debate had very a strong emotional  component  coming from the term shock
therapy  (nobody likes shock and wants to be treated  in this way).
Third,  some commentators and analysts thought the  official policy statements and
documents  identified  the kind of strategy adopted by specific  countries.  However, the official
policy declarations  were often misleading.
An example is the Russian transformation  in 1992-93  which was seen by many observers
as a case of shock therapy similar to the Balcerowicz's  program in Poland in 1989-91. At the
end of 1991, some government  documents and interviews of government  officials could give
limited reasons for such an assessment. Also, the political and intellectual  opposition  accused
Gaidar's and Fiodorov's team of using shock therapy.  This accusation  was meant to discredit
the most radical reformers in  the public's eyes.  In practice, however, it would be very
difficult to classify Russian transformation  policy as radical' 6 [see Dabrowski, et al,  1993;
Dabrowski  and Kozarzewski  (eds.), 1995; Sachs, 1994; Aslund, 1994].
Fourth, the length of the observation  period also played a significant role.  In  1990,
Hungary and  Poland  were seen  as  representing completely different approaches to  the
transformation  strategy. Poland was viewed as a leading case of shock therapy, and Hungary
was treated as an example of the gradual approach.  This difference was determined, to a
significant extent, by the different starting points of each country, especially in respect to
macroeconomic  equilibrium  and the level of domestic  and external liberalization. Differences
in the official rhetoric of each government played a  role here.  Now, after five years of
economic and political transformation, the real differences between these countries are not
very important. Both Hungary  and Poland have made comprehensive  and radical reforms and
have been successful  implementing  the "critical  mass" of systemic  changes. Both face similar
problems in  their  current  economic policies (fiscal crises,  big  public debt,  unfinished
privatization  process, difficulties  with inflation, etc.).
Fifth, the dichotomy,  shock therapy versus gradualism,  does not pay enough attention  to
the nature of the individual  components  of the transition policy  (see next section).
General debate on shock therapy versus gradualism is  oversimplified and of  small
practical  usefulness  with the specific  transition agenda and timetable.  If an argument is made
for the radical (shock) approach, it should be defined precisely.  On the other hand, if one
argues in favor of gradualism, the specific  measures  and their speed of implementation  should
be explained.
16 Apart from the privatization  program which was for more comprehensive,  quick and radical than in
many other  post-communist  countries  [see - Jermakowicz,  Pank6w,  and Abramov, 1994].
18The discussion about general  speed and  consistency of transition policy  has more merit
concerning  political  strategy.  This  relates  to  the  earlier  mentioned  problem  of  a  political
window of opportunity (or period of extraordinary politics using Balcerowicz's  terminology).
2. What must be done quickly, what can be done gradually?
Table  4  presents  a  general  picture  of  the  possible  and  recommended  speed  of  the
individual components of transition process.  (See Table 4 at the end of this paper.)
2.1.  Macroeconomic stabilization
Macroeconomic  stabilization,  especially  in  the  case  of  very  high  inflation  or
hyperinflation episodes,  must be a one time, comprehensive, and radical operation.  It  is hard
to  expect that  gradual macroeconomic  stabilization can work in  the specific  conditions of  a
transition economy.  The empirical evidence from Romania and Russia supports this view.
The transition  economies need a  tough stabilization policy at the very beginning  of the
transition process.  At least three factors are important here:
1.  A big monetary  overhang (stock of suppressed inflation) which is a product  of price
control,  shortage economy1 7and compulsory  savings,  and forced  substitutions usually
exist.  The size of this overhang has differed  between countries-the  biggest one was
probably in the FSU18 but Poland, Romania,  Bulgaria and Albania had large ones too;
far smaller  ones occurred  in the three most balanced socialist  economies,  the former
GDR,  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  Hungary.  However,  even  in  Hungary,  an  overhang
existed  and  complicated the process  of  domestic  and  external liberalization.  It  was
only  liberalization,  especially  domestic  price  liberalization  and  unification  of  the
exchange  rate,  that  "unfroze"  accumulated  monetary  overhang  and  caused  so-called
corrective  inflation.  A  tough  macroeconomic  policy  is  necessary  to  impede  the
conversion  of  one-time  corrective  inflation  into  permanent  high  inflation  or  even
hyperinflation.
2.  The  price  deregulation  and unification  of  the exchange  rate  (usually connected with
substantial  devaluation)  have  created  strong  inflationary  expectations,  i.e.,  have
contributed  to  decreasing  demand  for  domestic  money.  If  price  liberalization  is
implemented  gradually  and  preceded  by  a  long  public  discussion  (as  happened  in
Poland in 1987-89 and in the FSU in 1990-91), inflationary expectations are relatively
stronger  and the flow from  domestic money more dramatic.  The deregulation  of the
domestic  market  and  financial  system  of  SOEs-other  important  components  of  a
liberalization  package-also  have contributed  to  increasing  money  velocity  (because
7 The idea of shortage  economy  was introduced  to the economic  literature  by Janos Komai [1980].
18 For the estimation  of monetary  overhang  in the FSU, see Cottarelli  and Blejer  [1991].
19they have unfrozen  money balances of  SOEs  which were  very  strictly  controlled by
central planning  authorities'9 [see McKinnon,  1992]).  The last process  is sometimes
called the increase of the level of the internal currency convertibility.
3.  In  the  last  stages  of  communist  regimes,  many  governments  failed  to  maintain
elementary macroeconomic discipline.  They lost control over credit and wage policies,
accepted  huge  increases  of  subsidies  and  social  spending,  and  created  many  tax
exemptions.  All  that contributed to  an explosion of  the budget deficit and monetary
expansion.  The "softness"  of monetary,  fiscal, and income policy was caused by the
lack of political legitimization of the government who wanted to  "buy" social peace in
exchange for economic concessions.  Poland  in the late 1980s (under its last two pre-
democratic  governrnents)  and  the  Soviet  Union  during  last  years  of  Gorbachev
perestroika  are  examples.  On  the  microeconomic  level,  state  control  over  SOEs
became very weak and created a system vacuum.  The traditional plan targets did not
act any more,  and the pressure of domestic and foreign competition and the barriers of
demand were  still insufficient.  SOE managers were  no longer  subject to conmmunist
party or state administration control.  Moreover,  as a  result of  political liberalization
and the democratization progress, they could influence the government macroeconomic
policy  (of course,  further  relaxing  it) through  parliament,  lobbying  structures,  trade
unions, etc.
Partial,  inconsequential,  and  inconsistent  economic  reforms  can  be  seen  as  another
source  of  macroeconomic,  especially  fiscal,  problems.  Socialist  market  reforms  in
Yugoslavia, Hungary,  Poland,  and the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union are examples.
Greater autonomy of enterprises did not permit confiscation of their whole financial surplus by
the budget which formed a  significant source of budget incomes in  the classical model  of a
planned economy.  Economies under reform were not always able to replace this  income with
a sufficiently effective  tax system [McKinnon,  1992].  Selective price control,  coupled with
inflation, lead to increasing burdens for the state budget by way of subsidies (or decreasing the
revenues from the turnover tax).  The inflation also caused increasing pressure on the increases
of wages (including salaries financed by the budget) and social benefits.
In  addition  to  these  three  general  problems,  some  countries  have  had  other  ones.
Military conflict damages the production process,  trade relations,  and revenue collection and
makes big budget spending unavoidable.  Uncertainty about future currency arrangements (in
19 In the typical command  economy monetary  overhang  was neutralized  not only by price control but also
by various planning  and administrative  restrictions  and general regulation,  limiting the possibility  of its effective
spending.  Excessive money supply was neutralized  by making part of money balances "void" in some sense.
SOEs  that had cash or other liquid financial  assets could not use them freely to purchase goods and services, to
pay salaries, to invest, etc. Financial assets were fragmented  into different specific accounts, e.g.,  investment
spending,  wages. Additionally,  many basic goods, services,  or convertible  currency  were subject to administrative
rationing, i.e.,  having money was not enough to obtain such goods. The increase of economic  autonomy of
enterprises  and limitation  of administrative  distribution  of physical  resources  brought an increased  flow of existing
financial  resources.
20some FSU  and former  Yugoslavia [FY]  countries)  has devastated savings.  And the list of
problems goes on.
The size of the macroeconomic challenge has varied from country to country.  The first
two  factors  were  present  in  all  the  transition  economies.  The  third  one  was avoided  in
Czecho-Slovakia,  the  GDR,  and  Hungary.  These  countries  also  had  smaller  monetary
overhang and smaller inflationary expectations due to macroeconomic discipline.
The above characteristics have determined the agenda of  macroeconomic policy  in  the
first stage of transition.  All the countries  have had to  eliminate monetary  overhang and to
neutralize  inflationary  expectations  and  declining  demand  for  money  connected  with
liberalization.  Most of these countries must solve the problem of current  flow imbalances in
fiscal and monetary policies.
2.2.  Liberalization
Theoretically,  domestic  and  external  liberalization  can  be  implemented  either  in  one
radical  package  or  gradually,  step  by  step.  Successful  examples  of  both  approaches  are
apparent  [see e.g.,  Dornbusch and Helmers (eds.),  1988].  However,  the specific features of
post-communist  transformation  present  arguments  in  favor  of  a  more  radical  liberalization
scenario.  It  is connected,  among others,  with  negative fiscal implications  of  price control,
difficulty in privatizing an overregulated economy,  and the necessity of building a competitive
environment for state-owned enterprises.
The complex  price  liberalization  and  unification  of  the  exchange  rate  (as one  of  the
crucial price parameters) is the most urgent issue in the transition agenda.
First, price liberalization is necessary to allow the market allocation mechanism to work.
It concerns not only current allocation decisions but also investment decisions.  Liberalization
is important for elimination of price distortions inherited from the command economy.  Many
years of 'socialist  market'  reforms show that any government decision is not able to eliminate
those distortions in the administrative way.  A gradual liberalization of prices is not a rational
solution.  The appearance of price distortions and selective shortages (goods at still controlled
prices disappear  from  the market  very  fast)  is the negative aspect of  this variant.  Besides,
increasing inflationary expectations and money velocity are the standard by-products of such a
policy [see Dabrowski,  1992b].
Second,  price  liberalization  is  fundamental  for  the  reduction  of  subsidies  and  tax
exemptions which are necessary conditions of budget adjustment and contribute to the success
of the stabilization effort.  Without that step, eliminating the budget deficit is more difficult.
Third,  without  free  price  setting,  real  demonopolization  and  privatization  with  the
development of new private sector cannot be expected.
Fourth and  most important,  price deregulation  is crucial for the elimination of market
shortages.
21The transition experience shows that the successful elimination of the shortage economy
needs to fulfil at least four conditions:
1.  price liberalization (the most important one);
2.  efficient monetary control;
3.  external liberalization  (i.e.,  decreasing tariff and non-tariff barriers and free access to
foreign currency);
4.  allowing  free  private  entrepreneurship,  at least  in  the  area  of  domestic  and  foreign
trade.
Price liberalization is absolutely necessary in the very beginning of the transition process.
The  lack  of  full  liberalization  will  undermine  the  stabilization  effort  not  only  because  of
negative fiscal implications of the price control.  If the economy has a heavily distorted price
structure (the case of most of the FCC), the postponed liberalization must bring a price jump.
It  can  create  inflationary  expectations  and  hurt  achieved  stabilization  (as  it  happened  in
Ukraine in the end of 1994).
Demonopolizing  the  economy  first  and  liberalizing  prices  second  seems  unrealistic.
Usually,  liberalization  of  prices  is  necessary  much  faster  than  is  significant  progress  in
demonopolization.  In  addition,  real development of the private  sector (the  most  significant
factor of internal demonopolization)  will be  unlikely with the omnipresent control  of prices.
So there is no  practical possibility  of avoiding  deregulation of prices before  completing the
demonopolization of the domestic market.
Liberalization  of  foreign  trade  and  introduction  of  a  convertible  currency  become
inseparable elements accompanying the liberalization of the domestic market and deregulation
of  domestic prices.  Foreign  competition  should be  allowed  into the monopolized domestic
market, and the structure of domestic prices should be adjusted to the structure of prices in the
international market.  Thus,  the real reallocation of resources based upon the criteria  of the
world market can be initiated,  and comparative advantages for the economy from international
trade may be achieved.
If the necessity of external liberalization is recognized, the speed and the sequencing of
this process is controversial in the post-communist countries and elsewhere [Bruno,  1988, pp.
223--247].  Numerous goods,  so far  beyond the reach of the importers,  can now flow freely
into the country  and compete successfully with  domestic products.  Also, the adjustment of
domestic prices to  world prices forms  the real  test of truth.  It  shows that a  certain part of
economy is extremely  ineffective-not  only because it does not bring  profit but also because
its value added is negative (see Chapter 3, Section 4).
The  radical  opening  of  the  economy  (the  reunification  of  Germany  was an  extreme
example) in such a situation means the probability of sudden bankruptcy of a large number of
22enterprises with all the political and social consequences.  Some industries and enterprises must
be eliminated after opening up a post-communist economy.
Such a danger makes many politicians propose that external opening should be carefully
"dosed."  But the possibilities of demonopolization of the domestic market (the only fast means
in case of small and medium size countries) are lost.  Putting off the opening delays only the
test of truth for ineffective factories and businesses.  The general technological backwardness
of  post-communist  economies  does  not  provide,  in  principle,  chances  for  significant
reconstruction during  the  transition  period.  In  the meantime,  further  investment decisions
based on a falsified price system can be taken.  Lobbies interested in the protection of specific
industries usually become  seriously  weakened  in the beginning  of  transition  but  after some
time start to rebuild their political influence [see Gacs,  1994].  The idea of 'fine tuning'  policy
in  respect to  external liberalization  is hardly feasible from  the political  point of view.  The
experience of Russia and some other FSU countries, where the political opportunity for radical
export liberalization were lost in 1992 and never came back,  can be an important warning for
advocates of the gradualist approach to external liberalization.
Although the liberal approach is more painful during the initial stage of transformation,
it presents greater  chances for overcoming economic backwardness over the long term.  The
Russian experience  from  1992,  with price  liberalization  in a  still closed economy,  seems to
support this latter thesis.
2.3. Institutional changes
More  comprehensive  institutional  changes  usually  cannot  be  introduced  overnight,
especially in the new democratic regimes where the legislative process needs some time.  The
former German Democratic Republic is the only exception because it imported  all the market
institutions  from  the  West  Germany.20 The  speed  of  institutional  change  is  of  great
importance.  The sooner institutional progress can be achieved, the better  the results that can
be  expected in both  macro-  and microeconomic  policy spheres.  Some  examples  of needed
institutional  reform  are  the tax  system  and  tax  administration,  banking  sector  reform  and
restructuring,  insurance law, civil and commercial law, bankruptcy law, justice administration,
and budgetary law.
2.4.  Privatization
Privatization by its nature is a gradual process.  However,  it can be implemented faster
or slower, in a more or less market oriented way.21 Whether speed and political attractiveness
20 They were automatically  extended  on the former GDR territory according to the Treaty on Monetary,
Economic  and Social  Union  and on the basis of the Unification  Treaty.
21 Among less market-oriented  methods of privatization, one can distinguish different experiments  with
collective  or quasi-collective  ownership as well as insiders-oriented  privatization. These forms are especially
popular  in some FSU and FY countries.
23or quality (in  sense of  quick real restructuring)  should have priority  is probably the biggest
dilemma of privatization policy.
Arguments  in  favor  of rapid privatization have  a fundamental character.  The starting
point of the transformation  in the Central  and Eastern Europe countries was characterized by
exclusive  state  and  pseudo-cooperative  form  of  ownership  (Czecho-Slovakia,  Romania,
Bulgaria) or their significant domination (Poland,  Hungary).  Quick market  reform demands
quick ownership changes.  Progress  in other aspects of the transformation process depend on
the speed  of privatization.  In  the  same way,  the possibility of  coming  out  of  a  transition
output decline  depends  on  the  progress  in  ownership  changes.  The  Polish  experience  of
economic  growth  generated  mainly  by  new  private  and  privatized  enterprises  is  the  best
example here.
That, in turn,  directly and indirectly influences the durability of achieved macroeconomic
stabilization.  Bulgaria is another good example which should be  treated as a real warning to
other  countries  in  transition.  Early  in  1991,  this  country  started  with  radical  and  quite
successful liberalization and  stabilization programs.  However,  the privatization process  was
seriously delayed.  Only small privatization, based mainly on physical restitution,  was done.
The non-reformed sector of large,  state-owned enterprises quickly increased pressure  on state
budget and monetary policies,  leading to significant erosion of the macroeconomic situation in
the end of  1993 and  1994.  The politically powerful  groups involved  in  profit  shifting and
asset stripping from  non-reformed  SOEs to  private  sector emerged.  These groups have not
been interested to  support progress in real privatization and liberalization  parasitizing on the
unclear  status  quo  and  political  uncertainty  [see  Bogetic  and  Hillman,  1995].  A  similar
phenomenon can be observed in some FSU countries where privatization is delayed.
In the political sense, quick privatization was expected to encourage reconstruction of the
middle class who would form  the social base  for  the democratic  system  and  for the market
economy.  This  expectation  did  not  materialize  yet.  Although  some  important  changes in
social stratification are seen in countries which are the most advanced in the transition process
(including the formation a new entrepreneurial class), it is too early to expect quick changes in
the economic and political mentality inherited from the communist era.
However,  the  mass  privatization  program  is  putting  attention  on  the  distribution  of
property rights among the population.  This can give real political gains to some politicians.
The election success of Vaclav Klaus and his Citizen Democratic Party  in the Czech Republic
in  1992 is the one  example.  The neutralization  of  a very  strong communist  and  nationalist
opposition against privatization in Russia by  Anatolii Chubais  in  1992-93 was possible  only
because of the distributional aspect of the voucher program which gave significant concessions
to managers  and employees.  On the other hand,  the lack of a  clear  and socially  attractive
distributive component  of  the  National  Investment  Fund  (NFI)  program  in  Poland  did  not
allow a mobilization of social support for the mass privatization idea.
Like stabilization and  liberalization measures,  privatization  needs political  momentum.
If the best political time is lost, privatizers must work in far less comfortable conditions.  The
24history of Polish privatization is a good example here [see Earle,  Flydman,  and Rapaczyfiski,
1993].  Although  Poland  was  the  first  post-communist  country  in  which  privatization  was
discussed publicly  in 1986, the start of large privatization came only at the end of  1990 [see
Blaszczyk and Dabrowski,  1993].  (Privatization was also talked about in Hungary in  1986.)
The  best  political  time  for  privatization  (in  1990)  was  lost.  Even  the  idea  of  m.ass
privatization,  invented and popularized in all the Eastern Europe 22 by Janusz Lewandowski 23
and Jan Szomburg  [Lewandowski &  Szomburg,  1989] met  substantial political  resistance in
Poland and was implemented only at the end of 1995.24 Although the Polish economy is now
mostly privately  owned and presents  good progress  in restructuring,  the  development of the
new private sector as well as small and medium size privatization made this possible.  Most of
the large enterprises, especially in heavy industry, remain in state ownership and create serious
economic and political tensions.
Slovenia  and  Bulgaria  are  other  good  examples  of  countries  where  long  lasting
intellectual  and  political  debates  on  optimal  privatization  strategy  either  slowed  down
(Slovenia) or almost completely stopped (Bulgaria) real ownership transformation.
All that was said above shows that speed is a crucial economic and political parameter of
the privatization process and is far more important than its excellence or fiscal revenues.  An
important  question:  is  it  necessary  to  sacrifice  the  quality  of  the  privatization  process
(especially  the  possibility  to  create  private  owners  who  have  majority  control  over  an
enterprise) in favor of speed and distribution/political effect?
Of  the  three  rapid  privatization  stories  among  the  FCC  available  now,  i.e.,  East
Germany,  the Czech Republic,  and Russia,  only the first  one was achieved using  "classical"
methods elaborated in highly developed countries,  that is,  through the sale of state enterprises
on  commercial  principles,  careful  market  valuation  of  offered  property,  earlier  partial
restructuring of the firms,  etc.  A massive inflow of investments and managerial  cadres from
West Germany and huge financial transfers from the federal budget made this possible.  Even
in  such  favorable  circumstances  (not  available  at  any  other  FCC),  privatization  and  the
restructuring  process  were not  free from  strong social conflicts and political  frustration of a
significant part of the former GDR  society.  The Czech Republic and Russia had  to rely on
22 This idea was introduced  in the Soviet Union in 1985  by the independent  economist  Vitalii A. Naishul
[1985] and published in samizdat. Only a  small circle of dissidents in  the former USSR knew about it.
Lewandowski and  Szomburg proposed  it  independently during  the  conference on  'The  Proposals of
Transformations  of the Polish  Economy,' organized  by The Central School  of Planning and Statistics  in Warsaw,
on  17-18 November, 1988, which was the first international academic event in  Eastern Europe where the
privatization  issue  could be openly discussed.
23 He was the Minister of Ownership  Transformation  in Poland - from January to December 1991 and
from July 1992 to October  1993.
24 The history of the political struggle over the mass privatization  program in Poland is described by
Lewandowski  [1994].
25non-equivalent  (i.e., almost free of charge) 25 methods of distribution  of state-owned  assets and
gave up temporarily  the restructuring  targets.
The Czech Republic and Russia did not lose a chance for substantial restructuring  as
concentration  of diluted ownership will progress in the future.  Perhaps the investment  funds
created on a voluntary  basis can play a significant  role in a restructuring  process.  As far as
mass privatization  is based on individual, exclusive, and fully transferable  property rights, it
does not close prospects for real private ownership control in privatized enterprises.  In the
case of  Russia, the final result of  mass privatization will depend on  the macroeconomic
stability  and effective  liberalization  of its economy  (see the next section).
2.5. Restructuring
The purpose of restructuring is to change both the sectoral and branch structure of the
national  economy, and to change  the internal  structure and the behavior  of an individual  firm.
It is closely connected with huge structural distortions inherited from the centrally planned
economy  (see Chapter 2, Section 1).
The  restructuring of  state-owned enterprises is  not  a  one  step  process (as  price
liberalization  can be).  However, as in the case of privatization, it can be done with varying
speed.  Faster restructuring (as in East Germany)  can give a positive output response sooner
than a slower one.  In the meantime, however, it threatens a larger output decline, a larger
number of bankruptcies, and higher unemployment  that may have unpleasant political and
fiscal implications. On the other hand, if governments  want to slow down this process, open
or hidden 26 subsidization  often becomes  unavoidable. 27 It involves the risk of fiscal crisis and
negative  pressure on monetary policy, intensive  rent-seeking,  and slower economic  growth in
the future.  Governments  in the FCC will not be able to overcome the informational  barrier
(who really needs support and for how long) and monitor such a fine tuning policy without
losing  political  credibility  and stimulating  strong  political  pressure from different groups.
3. Two important sequencing issues
The mutual dependence  of stabilization  and liberalization,  and a few problems  within the
process of  liberalizing an economy have been discussed.  Remaining are two  important
questions  about the process of privatization.
25 There  was a registration  fee for the coupon  book (in Czecho-Slovakia)  or voucher (Russia).
26  These may take the form of tax exemptions, acceptance  of tax  arrears or by  accumulating non-
performing  assets  in the state-owned  banks  which  eventually  may be bailed  out by the government.
27 Wage  control may slow the restructuring  process  without  negative  implications  for the budget  (even with
a positive  impact  on the fiscal situation).
263.1 Can mass privatization  precede stabilization  and liberalization?
This first question asks whether widespread privatization  ought to precede stabilization
and liberalization.
Doing privatization first was a popular approach in the initial stage of the debate over
transition.  The USSR's  Program of  500 Days suggests a  different sequence from the
Balcerowicz  program in Poland.  (See 500 Days, 1990).  First, begin privatization  and absorb
the monetary overhang, then balance  the budget, and last, liberalize  prices.  According  to this
way of thinking, only after privatization  has been accomplished  can prices be liberalized and
economy  stabilized.
This sequence is based on two assumptions. The first is that privatization  is possible
before basic macroeconomic  stabilization  is achieved  and the liberalization  process completed.
The second assumption is that the massive sale of state owned assets can create substantial
income  for the budget. 28
Events in Russia partly confirmed the feasibility of the first assumption.  A radical,
comprehensive  privatization  package (the Chubais voucher program) was implemented  before
macroeconomic stabilization and  full  liberalization (especially external)  was  achieved.
However, privatization  without macroeconomic  stabilization,  adequate liberalization,  and the
reduction of  monopolies creates an unhealthy private  sector prone  to  bargain  with  the
government  rather than compete in international  markets.
Privatizations  in the FCC have not, in fact, created substantial  budget revenue.  First,
fiscal and monetary adjustment is necessary  very quickly, otherwise the economy will suffer
hyperinflation.  Starting privatization takes time, even in countries which decided to do it
rapidly (such as Germany, the Czech Republic, and Russia). Second, if privatization  is to be
done really quickly, the non-equivalent  methods of distribution  of state owned assets must be
adopted.  It  means, by  definition, zero or  almost zero 29 budget revenues and sometimes
substantial operational costs.  Third, in countries which tried not to  forget about budget
revenues  from privatization  (Poland  and Hungary), they never exceeded  0.5% of GDP.
Although radical privatization is very important for the final success of the transition
process, it cannot be  treated as a  substitute of  macroeconomic stabilization and relevant
monetary and fiscal adjustment.  To be effective from the microeconomic point of view,
privatization  must be preceded by successful  macrostabilization  and extensive liberalization  of
the economy.  If these conditions are not met, there is danger of creating a private sector
oriented  more toward political  rent-seeking  than effective  market competition. A privatization
process  can create more social tensions  than a more stable and open economy.
28  This last assumption  was made by Stefan Kawalec  [1989] in his privatization  proposal for the Polish
economy.
29 Sometimes  some fees for distributed  vouchers  (coupons,  certificates)  are collected.
273.2. What should be first: privatization or enterprise restructuring?
Advocates of  "conmmercial"  privatization,  based  on Western  (mainly  UK)  experience,
usually propose restructuring prior to privatization in order to make the latter more successful
from a business point of view and more profitable for the state budget.  Protection  of future
small  shareholders  from  investment  risk  also  plays  an  important  role  here.  The  1990
Privatization  Law in Poland  (at least its  "capital" privatization component)  was built  on this
assumption.  However,  the  argument  of  monitoring  the  social  and  political  costs  of
restructuring was also raised in favor of restructuring before privatization [see Roland, 1994].
Those who favored privatization first argued that the state has very  limited capacity to
deal  with  enterprise  restructuring,  especially  in  post-communist  economies  where  the  state
apparatus  is  extremely  weak  and  the  size  of  the  state  sector  is  enormous.  Moreover,
restructuring is a time and money consuming process,  very sensitive to political  pressure and
lobbying.  Proponents of quick privatization wanted to use a simplified procedure of selection,
valuation,  and  decision-making  or  to  try  voucher  privatization  schemes.  The  task  of
restructuring should be left for future private owners.
Practical experience justified  the second approach rather than the first.  However,  some
preparatory  measures  should  be  taken  by  the  government  administration  prior  to
commercialization  and  privatization.  Breaking  up  multi-plant  enterprises  needs  special
attention.  Selling  several small  pieces is easier  than selling  big  conglomerates  with  strong
inside differentiation.  This relates also to the enterprise's  technical and social infrastructure. 30
To cut off these activities is not easy from political point of view, but to privatize enterprises
and keep all this burden is often impossible.
4. Advantages and disadvantages  of slow transition
The  speed  and  sequencing  of  the  transition  debate  continues.  Slow  and  gradual
macroeconomic stabilization does  not make  sense for  countries  which entered  the transition
process with a  big monetary  overhang and substantial  fiscal and monetary  flow imbalances.
The rationality of slow price and trade liberalization applies only in countries which had more
open and deregulated economies before the post-communist transition started and inherited less
price  and structural  distortions (Hungary  and the former  Yugoslavia).  The real  choices are
about the speed of privatization, more sophisticated institutional changes, and the restructuring
of state-owned enterprises.
There are two advantages for slower transition in the microsphere and in the institutional
sphere.  First,  more  gradual  changes make  accommodation to  the new  rules  of  game  and
institutions easier.  It  concerns  producers,  consumers,  and  the  public  administration  which
30 Big socialist  enterprises  were usually "overloaded"  with technical,  social, and cultural infrastructures
serving not only them but also local areas (power and heating stations, cultural centers, stadiums, sport clubs,
clinics,  technical  schools,  infants' nurseries  and kindergartens,  etc.).
28must also pass the complicated  period of transition  and  have time  to  learn the new  system.
Second,  slower restructuring  of SOEs can dilute,  to some extent,  political  resistance against
change.  Too large a number of bankruptcies in a relatively short period of time and too high a
level of open unemployment is probably not acceptable politically, even for the most popular
government.
Two other potential advantages are more problematic than the previous ones.  First, the
advocates of gradualism  stress that a slower path of transition  allows for better  designed and
mutually coordinated institutional changes.  This is not always true because it creates a danger
of  a  longer systemic  vacuum  in  the  meantime  (see below),  and  it often  contributes  to  the
frequent  phenomenon  of  the  political  instability  in  the  FCC.  Taking  more  time  for
institutional changes runs the risk that pieces of legislation enacted later may not be consistent
with  those  enacted  earlier.  Second,  many  authors  [e.g.  Aghion  and  Blanchard,  1993]
underline  negative  fiscal  implications  of  microeconomic  restructuring  too  rapidly  (with  the
collapse  of  budget  revenues  and  the  explosion  of  social expenditures).  They  call  for  the
optimal  speed  of  transition.  This  hypothesis  needs,  however,  more  detailed  verification.
Some  rough  comparisons  of  FCC  fiscal  situations  show  that  countries  more  advanced  in
transition,  which  adopted  radical  transition  strategies  (groups  2  and  3),  are  doing  better
generally in this sphere than other countries [de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb,  1995].
The ineffectiveness of a slow transition has a potentially positive aspect.  In some recent
cases, the negative effects of the slow transition  (mainly macroeconomic disregulation) helped
overcome  social and political  reservations towards  a radical  strategy.  A feeling  that things
could not be  worse  and that  in reality  there  is nothing to  lose reduced  the political  risk  of
urging  a  faster  transition.  The  macroeconomic  chaos,  corruption,  and  criminality  of
disregulated economic life may push the society and the government toward  radical solutions.
That  is what  happened  in  Poland  in  1987-89,  in  part  of  the  FSU  in  1989-91,  and  in  the
Ukraine in 1992-94.  However,  it is a very risky game.  The 'positive'  way out from the deep
economic and social crises is not the only solution.  Alternatively,  long lasting economic and
social crises and repressive dictatorships may be the result of the inability of young democratic
regimes to manage the economic transition from planned economies to market economies.
Once the political window of opportunity is lost for radical economic transformation,  it
may  not  return.  The  Latin  American  experience  shows  that  once  vicious  circle  of
macroeconomic populism and dictatorship is started,  it is not easy to stop.  Sometimes 20 or
30 years  was lost  for countries  like Argentina,  Peru,  or Brazil  before they  found a  way to
economic and political stability.
There are other disadvantages of gradual transition (especially when this process is badly
coordinated) apart from the risk of losing the unique political window of opportunity.  Table 5
gives a list of traps connected with slow transition.  (See Table 5 at the end of the paper.)
The  main  microeconomic  danger  concerns  a  systemic  vacuum  where  old  rigors  of  a
command economy no longer act and the influence of the market mechanism is still too small
to influence the economic behavior of enterprises.  This half-plan and half-market economy, or
29in extreme  cases,  a  non-plan and  non-market  economy,  does  not respond  to  any  influence.
Soft budget constraints allow SOEs to continue their excessive demand for various inputs and
make them  inflexible in  relation  to  market  signals.  Additionally,  an  ownership vacuum  is
created when the state owner,  for political and administrative reasons,  has lost the capacity to
execute its property rights,  and the public ownership has not been privatized enough.
The  negative  macroeconomic  consequences  of  a  slow  transition  manifest  themselves
mainly through  a big budget deficit from continued open and hidden subsidization connected
with soft budget constraints and excessive social obligations of the state.  The budget deficit,
together  with  a  soft credit  policy  in  relation to  the SOE  sector,  results  in a  big  monetary
expansion.  Excessive demand must lead to serious balance of payments difficulties.
Although  some elements  of a  systemic vacuum  during  the transition  period  cannot be
avoided,  the government  should try to shorten  this period as much as possible to avoid both
macro- and microeconomic mismanagement.
Unfortunately,  the experiences  of almost  all  slow (group  4)  and  very  slow (group  5)
reformers  is  very  discouraging.  Continuing  market  shortages  (due  to  incomplete  price
liberalization),  inflation or hyperinflation,  decreasing  output,  and balance of payments crises
have  been  the  standard  economic  problems  in  countries,  such  as  the  Ukraine,  Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Russia.  Only few gradual reformers  (Hungary and Slovenia from group 3)
avoided  these  negative  consequences  because  they  started  transition  with  more  advanced
market regulation and with a better macroeconomic equilibrium (see Chapter 3, Section 2).
The  necessity  of  constructing  various  substitute  solutions  for  the  transition  period  is
another weakness of gradual (slow) strategy.  Palliative solutions, in general,  do not bring  the
economy closer  to  final market  solutions.  These  solutions  start living  their  own  lives and
create an  independent logic of behavior  of economic agents.  Their unexpected  side effects
make additional intervention and regulation necessary.  The energy of government  is used not
for quick achievement of final,  economic solutions but for improving temporary  instruments.
The transformation period becomes extended in time,  and economic policy gets into a vicious
cycle of over-regulation.
Post-communist governments that engage in excessive intervention have met immediately
informational  and  administrative barriers.  Informational  barriers  are well  known  from  the
centrally planned economy.  Central authorities have to rely on information received from the
bottom  level-from  enterprises,  associations,  etc.  This  information  is,  of  course,  heavily
influenced by the micro interests of the economic agents trying to obtain as much as possible
from  the  government.  The  strong  political  bargaining  and  intensive  rent-seeking  become
unavoidable consequences of excessive government intervention [Dabrowski, 1994].
Government  administration  in  the  FCC,  connected  with  its  political  and  institutional
transformation,  is  extremely  weak  [Aslund,  1994;  Dabrowski,  1994].  It  has  tremendous
problems  fulfilling  the  elementary  functions  of  any  state,  such  as  public  security,  justice
administration,  public enforcement  of contacts,  protection of private property  rights,  tax and
30custom duty  collection,  etc.  Overloading  the  government with  additional  tasks worsens  its
performance.
Every  government,  but  especially  the  post-communist  ones,  faces  the  problem  of
credibility.  Faster,  more dynamic,  and consistent changes increase this credibility in relation
to  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic  policies.  It  creates  positive  expectations,  brings
inflation down earlier,  and pushes SOEs toward  quicker restructuring.  On the other hand,  a
slow pace of  change,  policy compromises,  maintaining  subsidization (even  if proclaimed  as
temporary),  or attempting a bail out  (even if it is declared a one time deal) increase  illusions
that implemented reforms are not definite and can be reversed under political pressure.
The experience of  "socialist market  reforms" played an important role here.  It  showed
that  partial and  gradual changes did not often give any perceptible  effect.  The massive old
system  swallowed  and  adapted  new  instruments  and  institutions.  The  changes  seemed
temporary.  Substantial transformations  need to  be  made  in  the  way  which makes  an  easy
return to the centralized system impossible and will change expectations of economic agents.
5. How do the initial conditions matter?
The differences  in the starting conditions  of individual  countries  have varied:
*  the level of economic development;
*  how long the command system and communist regime lasted;
*  the share of the private sector in the national economy;
*  the size of structural distortions,  including dependence on CMEA or inter-FSU
markets and  the level of militarization that determines the size of the absorption
of adverse shock;
*  openness of the economy in relation to the capitalist countries;
*  availability of easily tradable natural resources;
*  the level of domestic and external macroeconomic equilibrium;
*  the experience  or  lack of experience with  market  socialism  reforms  and their
results;
*  the  level  of political  liberalization  and  democratization  before  the communist
system collapsed;
*  the strength of anti-communist and pro-independence movements in the past;
*  ethnic homogeneity or differentiation;
31*  the quality of state administration and the legal system [see Sachs, 1995]; and
*  the presence of militant trade unions [see Balcerowicz and Gelb,  1994].
All these factors have made the conditions of  economic and political  transformation  of
each country  unique.  Very  often,  it  led politicians  in each  country  to  emphasize  specific
problems and use them as an excuse for not implementing necessary reforms  on time  or for
doing them badly in inconsistent ways.  The slogan,  "we are an unique case and we must look
for  our  own  variant  of  transition"  is frequently  heard  in  countries  with  delayed  economic
transitions,  such as the Ukraine  or Belarus.  In practice  this  postulate  means rejection  of a
radical and consistent variant of transformation a la Poland, the Czech Republic,  or Estonia in
favor  of  some  variant  of  gradualism  with  less  macroeconomic  discipline,  gradual
liberalization,  greater  government  intervention,  and  slow privatization  (or  looking for  some
"third way" solution).
Some  countries  started  and  implemented  their  transition  policy  in  relatively  better
circumstances:  they  inherited  fewer macroeconomic  imbalances from  the  communist  system
(Czecho-Slovakia, the former GDR,  and Hungary to some extent),  fewer structural distortions
(Hungary,  Slovenia,  Poland),  a  partially  liberalized economy,  and  some  market  institutions
(Hungary,  the  former  Yugoslavia,  Poland),  some  enclaves  of  private  economy  (Poland,
Hungary),  some democratic traditions (CEE and the Baltics in comparison with the rest of the
FSU and Albania).
The  same concerns  implementation conditions.  As was mentioned earlier,  the size of
adverse  shocks has differed  significantly  across  the  region  with  Bulgaria,  and  most  of  the
European  FSU  countries  except  Russia,  bearing  the biggest  burden.  Some  countries  have
suffered war destruction that stopped completely any reforms (Bosnia, the Caucasian countries,
Tadjikistan) or  delayed  them  significantly (Moldova,  Croatia).  On the  other hand,  Russia,
Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, due to presence of rich and easy  tradable natural
resources,  have an easier task of structural adjustment. 31 The size of Western assistance has
differed significantly among the countries with Poland,  Albania and Baltic states as the relative
leaders [see Kaminski and Wang,  1995; Dabrowski,  1995].
Can  worse starting  and implementation  conditions serve as  a justification  for  a slower
and  less  inclusive  economic  transition?  The  above  analysis  gives  a  negative  answer.
Moreover,  countries beginning  transition  in  less favorable  economic and  political  situations
(countries  of  the  FSU,  Romania,  Bulgaria  or  Albania),  which  were  more  devastated  in
political,  economic,  and  psychological  terms  by  communist  regimes  and  inherited  fewer
market  institutions  than  Poland,  Hungary,  or  the  former  Yugoslavia,  had  no  choice.  A
strategy of slow or very slow changes meant they risked serious economic and political crises.
Gradualism was a  feasible option only  for countries  with  a relatively  good  starting position
such as Hungary.
31  This factor, however,  seems  to have  a rather demobilizing  influence  on political  elite.
326. Does democracy  help economic  transition?
The turbulence  in the transition process created by the unstable political life in the FCC
raises some doubts that a young democracy is the best political regime for complicated and
socially painful economic reforms.  The East Asia experience argues in  favor of a  more
authoritarian  solution.  South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and recently China and
Vietnam implemented  market oriented reforms under totalitarian regimes.  Chile is another
example of a serious economic transition pushed forward under the umbrella of a military
dictatorship.
Is a pragmatic dictatorship a feasible and rational choice for FCC societies and their
political  elites?
Before answering this  question,  interrelationships between democracy and  market
economy  should  be analyzed. While it is clear that a stable, free market economy  can co-exist
with a non-democratic  political regime, the opposite situation, i.e.,  a democracy under the
domination of  state ownership and  central planning, can  hardly  survive.  Likewise, a
democratic  regime will struggle to survive permanent very high inflation or hyperinflation.
However, an  unhealthy political system can  severely damage the  economic system and
economic  policy
The free market can work without democracy, and some people may expect that an
authoritarian  solution would  help to protect the smooth economic  transition  from the instability
connected with  young,  imperfect democracy.  However, this  solution is  not  a  realistic
alternative  for CEE and the FSU.  There are some reasons  for it:
First, democracy and political freedom have autonomous  value for many contemporary
societies, and they will not be traded for an economic standard of living.  Most of CEE and
FSU countries  which have a relatively  high level of education  feel this way [see Sachs, 19951.
Moreover, the democratic emancipation  became a dominant political trend during last twenty
years and  is  strongly supported and  stimulated (both positively and  negatively) by  the
developed  countries (G-24). A country which would  decide to abandon  democracy  and choose
an authoritarian  solution would  be a subject  of international  ostracism.
Second,  the  economic transition  in  the  FCC  would  not  have  begun  if  political
liberalization  and democratization  did not happen.  All the experience  of pre-transition  reforms
shows that they never could reach some critical points (like abandoning  the monopoly  of state
ownership)  because the communist  political regime did not allow it (even in its most liberal
version as  in  Hungary or  Poland).  Moreover, countries which have achieved the most
progress in the economic  transition (see Chapter 3, Section 1) are usually  the same ones as the
leaders in the democratization  process [see de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb,  1995; Karatnycky,
1995]. Sound  democratization  allows the break up of the political  and economic  domination  of
the former communist  oligarchy (so-called nomenklatura)  and eliminates  economic structures
inherited from the communist systems.  Countries that have made only partial progress in
democratization  and political liberalization  have serious problems with real demonopolization
and deconcentration  of domestic market structures, external liberalization, removing  subsidies
33and implementing hard budget constraints, avoiding organized clearing of  inter-enterprise
arrears, implementing  real positive interest rate policy, starting the mass-scale transparent
privatization, rotation of  SOE managers, etc.  The economic policy of  these countries is
dominated  by strong rent-seeking  groups  of special interests [see Aslund, 1994].
Third, for the reasons explained in the previous paragraph, the probability of a  free
market oriented authoritarian  regime in the FCC is very low.  Such a regime either  would try
objectively to protect  the economic and political interests of the former communist  oligarchy
(even  using  the  strong  anti-communist  rhetoric)  and  declining,  backward  sectors  of  the
economy or to promote an openly populist policy.
Political  reforms  and economic  reforms  must  be  promoted  actively  at  the same time.
Some of the political troubles of Poland have their roots in the lack of new a constitution and
in  the  serious  weakness  of  the  proportional  election  law  in  1991-93.  The Belarusian  and
Ukrainian instability and economic populism can be explained in the weakness of constitutional
regulation as well as in the election system.  On the other hand,  some very limited progress in
the political  institutions like the party system in Russia after  1993 (in  comparison with most
other FSU countries but still behind CEE countries) was possible due to the new constitution
and  a  mixed  election  scheme  adopted  during  the  December  1993 general  election.  Very
impressive  results  of  Czech  transition  were  possible  due  to  very  close  coordination  of
economic and political reforms.
34V. Conclusions
The empirical experience of the period 1989-94 gives many valuable observations which
can contribute to the initial discussion on the speed and sequencing of the transition  process.
Macroeconomic  stabilization  and  liberalization  must  be  done  quickly,  but  other  aspects  of
transition may take more time.  For example,  the privatization process needs to have a  legal
base and  organizational infrastructure  created.  However, even in the case of privatization,  a
rapid  transition  seems  less  risky  for  restructuring  and  for  more  complicated  institutional
reforms than a slow one.
These  conclusion  have  practical  value  as  well  as  theoretical  importance.  Several
countries,  sometimes large and politically important (e.g.,  the Ukraine,  and Belarus) have not
decided definitely what transition strategy they want to choose.  The transformation experience
accumulated so far by the other countries would help them to make an adequate decision.
Some important conclusions discussed in this paper are worth repeating once more:
First,  there is no way to avoid a relatively  large output decline,  especially of industrial
production  in  the  state  sector.  Its  degree  of  inevitability  largely  depends  on  the  inherited
structural  distortions.  Those  countries that  were  not afraid  to undertake  a  radical transition
program geared towards stabilization and liberalization,  and that decided to privatize relatively
quickly  and  open  the  economy  to  foreign  capital  (the  first  three  categories  from  my
classification),  were  the  first  to  arrest  the  output  decline  and  restore  economic  growth.
Albania,  Poland,  East Germany, 32 Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  Slovenia, the Baltic countries,
and recently Hungary seem to be on the path of sustainable economic growth.
On the other hand,  those countries that attempted to maintain previous production levels
through  subsidies,  credit  expansion, and  protectionism have already recorded  more  dramatic
GDP decreases than those that chose the radical scenario,  with few prospects for a  return to
economic growth.  This decline has been accompanied by high inflation or hyperinflation,  with
all the attendant social costs,  such as more unequal distribution of  income and wealth or the
deep criminalization of economic activity.
Second,  the  policy  of  granting  concessions  to  and  bargaining  with  various  pressure
groups does not produce the expected political results and does not increase social acceptance
of the changes under way.  Here the experience of Russia, Romania, the Ukraine,  and Belarus
is the best  proof.  On the other  hand,  where  a  strong  institutional  foundation  of  a market
economy  has  been  established,  even  when  the  political  forces  of  the  ancient  regime  are
returned to power in elections, they have had to continue the policy of reform.
32  East  Germany,  where  strong  economic  growth  has also returned,  can be seen  as an exception  in that
output  decline  in 1990-1992  was  extremely  severe.  The  reason  seems  to lie in the uncontrolled  rise of wages  paid
by East  German  enterprises  toward  the  West  German  level.
35Third, the comprehensiveness and appropriate sequence of changes play a decisive role.
In particular,  effective institutional changes cannot be introduced when the economy remains
in macroeconomic imbalance and closed to external competition.  The example of the radical
Russian  privatization,  performed  under  conditions  of  high  inflation,  "soft"  financing  of
enterprises,  and an absence of competition,  should be a good lesson to those politicians who
would  like  to  postpone  the  politically  difficult  tasks  of  stabilization  and  deregulation.
Formally  privatized  enterprises  that remain  dominated by  insiders,  i.e.,  under  manager  and
employee  ownership  and  acting  in  a  very  "soft"  environment,  continue  to  behave  like
traditional state enterprises.  They prefer to bargain with the state rather  than to compete on
international markets.  Bulgaria's  experience shows the opposite danger:  insufficiently  rapid
progress  in privatization  also  undermines  the positive  results  of  macroeconomic policy  and
creates political obstacles to further reforms.
Fourth, one should not be afraid of "aiming too high" when embarking on a stabilization
program  or any other component  of transformation policy.  The practice  of post-communist
countries shows that this danger is not likely to materialize.  What is more likely to happen is
diluting  the program  to a degree  that makes  it ineffective.  The ability to  act fast  and with
determination seems more important than technical perfection in designing policy instruments.
Political consent to reform measures does not usually last long, so it should be used in full.  If
that opportunity  is wasted  (as  it was in  Ukraine when  that country  gained  independence in
1991), the next one may a long time in coming.
Except  East  Germany,  countries  that  can  be  considered  as  leaders  in  the  transition
(groups 2 and 3) still have a long way to go to finish this process.  The most urgent tasks for
these seem to be the following:
1.  taking  inflation  down  to  the  level  comparable  with  the  West  European,  US,  and
Japanese standards of a few percent per year; (Only the Czech Republic is a relatively
close to this target.)
2.  stopping the increase of public debt (of crucial importance for Hungary and Poland);
3.  continuing  the  large  scale  privatization;  (Even  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic  and
Hungary  have  ca.  40%  GDP  contributed  by  the  public  sector;  the  big  industrial
enterprises,  public utilities,  and banks  seem to  be in the most  difficult position in the
remaining agenda.)
4.  deregulation of the housing market;
5.  beginning the fundamental  reform of a  social safety net with the pension system as a
top  priority;  (Progress  in  this  area  is  critical  for  the  fiscal  performance  and  labor
mobility.)
6.  deep reforms  are  also needed in  the sphere  of social services such  as education and
health; and
7.  most countries need reforms  of public administration and strengthening the local self-
government.
36Postscript
During the first  10 months of  1995 one could observe an acceleration  of the transition
process  in  countries  that  I  classified  in  the  end  of  1994  as  relatively  delayed.  Croatia,
Lithuania,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Moldova  continued  fast  and  comprehensive  reforms  on  all  the
fronts.  Armenia,  Kazakhstan and Georgia have become the next generation of the fast post-
Soviet  reformers.  Romania  and  Russia  strengthened  substantially  their  macroeconomic
policies.  Romania joined  the group  of countries with  moderate inflation (of  course,  taking
into account FCC standards) below 50% per year.  Russia has more difficult way because of a
big  inflationary inertia accumulated during the previous years.  The same can be observed in
Ukraine which  started a complex transition program  in the end  of  1994 but  inflation is still
very high  and final results uncertain.  Belarus and Uzbekistan are two other countries which
seem  to  start  in  1995  more  serious  stabilization  effort  but  they  are  still  delayed  with
privatization and other institutional reforms.
If progress continues,  the classification proposed in Chapter 3 will become very quickly
only a historical one.  However,  the recent developments have delivered additional arguments
in favor of quick and radical transition strategy.
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42Table  1:
GDP  Growth  (+) or Decline  (-)  in Selected  Transition  Economies
Category  Country  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995a  Cumulative
1989-1995
2  Poland  +0.2  -11.5  -7.6  +2.6  +3.8  +6.0  +5.5  -2.4
2  Czech  Republic  +0.4  -3.0  -10.0  -5.0  -0.9  +2.6  +4.0  -12.0
2  Slovakia  -1.0  -2.5  -11.2  -7.0  -4.1  +4.8  +5.0  -15.9
2  Albania  +9.8  -10.0  -27.7  -9.7  +9.6  +9.4  +7.8  -16.6
2  Estonia  +3.3  -8.1  -11.3  -19.3  -6.6  +6.0  +6.0  -28.7
2  Latvia  +  5.7  -3.4  -8.3  *33.8  .14.8  +1.9  +0.4  -46.0
3  Hungary  +0.7  -3.5  -11.9  -4.5  -0.8  +2.0  +11.2  -16.3
3  Slovenia  -3.6  -2.6  -9.3  -6.5  +1.3  +5.0  +4.5  -11.5
4a  Lithuania  +  1.1  -6.9  -13.1  -37.7  -24.2  +1.7  +5.3  -58.1
4a  Kyrgyzstan  +3.8  +3.2  -5.0  -19.1  -16.0  -26.5  +  2.0  -48.2
4a  Moldova  +8.8  -1.5  -18.0  -21.3  -8.7  -22.1  +1.5  -50.1
4b  Romania  -5.8  -5.6  -15.1  -13.5  +1.3  +3.5  +4.5  -28.4
4b  Russia  +  1.5  -3.6  -12.9  -18.5  -15.0  -12.0  -4.3  -50.3
4c  Bulgaria  -1.9  -9.1  -11.7  -5.6  -2.4  +1.4  +2.3  -24.7
5  Belarus  +  7.9  -3.2  -1.9  -9.6  -10.6  -20.2  -13.8  -43.0
5  Kazakhstan  -0.3  -0.8  -13.0  -14.0  -12.0  -25.0  -11.0  -56.5
5  Turkmenistan  -7.0  +1.8  -4.7  -5.3  -10.0  -20.0  -1.0  -39.1
5  Ukraine  +4.1  -3.6  -11.9  -17.0  -16.8  -23.7  -10.3  -58.2
5  Uzbekistan  +3.7  +1.6  -0.9  -9.5  -2.4  -3.4  -4.0  -14.5
6  Armenia  +8.0  -7.2  -11.8  -52.0  -14.1  +5.3  +5.1  -59.7
6  Azerbeijan  -6.3  -11.7  -0.7  26.8  -23.1  -22.0  -8.7  -67.1
6  Croatia  1.5  -8.5  -28.7  -24.8  -3.7  +0.8  +5.0  -50.7
6  Georgia  +  2.6  11.1  20.6  -42.7  -39.2  -35.0  -5.0  -83.4
6  Tadjikistan  2.9  -1.6  -8.7  -30.0  11.1  -21.4  -19.5  -65.7
Source:  The  World  Bank,  IMF  and  PlanEcon  data  base;  World  Economic  Outlook,  IMF,  October  1995,  table  4.
a Forecast
43Table  2:
Inflation  in  the  Selected  Transition  Economies
(CPI  -average  of  the  year  to  average  of  the  previous  year)
Category  Country  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
2  Poland  251.0  586.0  70.3  43.0  35.3  32.2
2  Czech  Republic  2.3  10.8  56.7  11.1  20.8  10.2
2  Slovakia  0.0  10.8  61.2  10.1  23.0  14.0
2  Albania  0.0  0.0  35.5  225.9  85.0  28.0
2  Estonia  6.1  23.1  210.6  1069.0  89.0  48.0
2  Latvia  4.7  10.5  124.4  951.2  109.0  36.0
3  Hungary  17.0  29.0  34.2  22.9  22.5  19.0
3  Slovenia  1306.0  549.7  117.7  201.2  32.0  19.8
4a  Lithuania  2.1  8.4  224.7  1020.3  390.2  72.0
4a  Kyrgyzstan  0.0  3.0  85.0  854.6  1208.7  280.0
4a  Moldova  0.0  4.2  98.0  1276.0  789.0  327.0
4b  Romania  1.1  5.1  174.5  210.9  256.0  131.0
4b  Russia  2.2  5.6  92.7  1353.0  896.0  220.0
4c  Bulgaria  6.0  22.0  333.5  82.0  72.8  89.0
5  Belarus  1.7  4.5  83.5  969.0  1188.0  2200.0
5  Kazakhstan  0.0  4.2  91.0  1610.0  1760.0  1980.0
5  Turkmenistan  2.1  4.6  102.5  492.9  3102.0  2400.0
5  Ukraine  2.0  4.0  91.2  1210.0  4735.0  842.0
5  Uzbekistan  0.7  3.1  82.2  645.0  534.0  746.0
6  Armenia  0.0  10.3  100.0  825.0  3732.0  5458.0
6  Azerbeijan  0.0  7.8  105.6  616.0  833.0  1500.0
6  Croatia  2520.5  135.6  249.5  938.2  1516.0  98.0
6  Georgia  0.0  3.3  78.5  913.0  3126.0  18000.0
6  Tadiikistan  0.0  4.0  111.6  1157.0  2195.0  452.0
Sources:  de  Melo,  Denizer,  Gelb  [19951,  table  3.
44Table  3:
Registered  Unemployment  Rates  as  Percentage  of  Labor  Force  (end  of  year)
Category  Country  1989  1  990  1991  1992  1993  1994
2  Poland  0.1  6.1  11.8  13.6  16.4  16.0
2  Czech  Republic  0.0  0.8  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2
2  Slovakia  0.0  1.5  11.8  10.4  14.4  14.8
2  Albania  1.9  7.7  8.6  26.9  28.9  19.5
2  Estonia  0.0  0.0  0.1  4.8  8.8  8.1
2  Latvia  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.1  5.3  6.5
3  Hungary  0.3  2.5  8.0  12.3  12.1  10.9
3  Sloveniaa  2.9  4.7  8.2  11.1  14.5  14.5
4a  Lithuania  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.3  4.4  3.8
4a  Kyrgyzstan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7
4a  Moldova  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.8  1.2
4b  Romania  0.0  0.0  3.0  8.4  10.2  10.9
4b  Russia  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  1.1  2.2
4c  Bulgaria  0.0  1.5  11.1  15.3  16.4  12.8
5  Belarus  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.5  1.5  2.1
5  Kazakhstan  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.6  1.0
5  Turkmenistan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a.
5  Ukraine  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.4
5  Uzbekistan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3
6  Armenia  1.0  1.0  3.5  3.5  6.2  5.6
6  Azerbeijan  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.9
6  Croatia  n.a.  9.3  15.5  17.8  17.5  18.0
6  Georgia  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  8.4  n.a.
6  Tadjikistan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1  1.7
Sources:  de  Melo,  Denizer,  Gelb  119951,  table  10.
a Annual  average
45Table  4:
What  Can  be  Done  Gradually?
Area  Can  be  done  gradually  If YES,  what  are  the  main  dangers  or  negative  implications
Macroeconomic  NO
stabilization
Domestic  liberalization  NO;  YES  In  exceptional Price  distortions,  inflation.  expectations,  fiscal  problems,  delayed
situations  demonopolization  and  privatization
External  liberalization  YES  Price  distortions,  weaker  competition,  less  pressure  for
restructuring
Privatization  YES  Delayed  restructuring,  pressure  for macropolicy,  intensive  rent-
seeking,  informal  privatization
Restructuring  of  the  YES  Delayed  restructuring,  fiscal  crisis,  other  pressure  for
state  sector  macropolicy,  intensive  rent-seeking,  the  information  and  political
(subsidization)  barrier  in  monitoring,  credibility  problem
46Table  5:
Traps  of  Slow  Transition
TRAPS  OF  SLOW  TRANSITION
1.  Microeconomic  traps  -mainly  the  danger  of  systemic  vacuum
. in  regulatory  sense  (central  planning  does  not  work  already,  market  competition  does  not
start  yet)
*  the  lack  of  effective  property  rights
2.  Macroeconomic  traps  (especially  in  countries  which  started  with  big  macroeconomic  disbalances)
*  the  danger  of  a big  budget  deficit,  monetary  expansion  and  hyperinflation
*  the  danger  of  a balance  of payment  crisis
3.  Credibility  issue  (macro  and  micro  aspect)  domestic  and  external
4.  Information  and  administrative  barriers  of  monitoring  slow  transition  + problem  of  transitory  solutions
(e.g.  subsidization,  price  control,  foreign  trade  control)
5.  Economic  costs
•  greater  cumulative  decline  of GOP
*  higher  inflation,  less  domestic  and  external  savings
*  more  balance  of  payments  problems
6.  SRcial  costs
*  unemployment  issue
*  more  unequal  distribution  of income  and  wealth
*  more  corruption  and  criminal  behavior
7.  Lost  political  opportunities  (limited  political  patience  and  acceptance  for  radical  changes)
7a.  Rebuild  pressure  groups
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